The Impact of Minimum Wages on Job Training: An Empirical Exploration with Establishment Data by David Fairris & Roberto Pedace
The Impact of Minimum Wages on Job Training:














Using data from the National Employer Survey (NES), this study examines the relationship
between wages and on-the-job training.  Traditional theory argues that workers may finance on-
the-job human capital accumulation through lower wages.  A binding minimum wage may,
therefore, reduce workplace training if it prevents low-wage workers from offering wage cuts to
help finance training.  Empirical findings in this area have failed to reach a consensus on the
training effects of minimum wages.  However, previous research has relied primarily on survey
data from individual workers, which typically possess poor measures of job training and little
information about the characteristics of firms.  Unlike previous research, this study addresses the
issue of minimum wages and on-the-job training with a unique employer survey.  We find strong
evidence to suggest that minimum wages are associated with a reduction in the percentage of an
establishment’s workforce receiving training, but only weak evidence indicating that minimum
wages reduce the average number of hours establishments devote to training activities.
* The authors thank Bill Carter, Arnie Reznek, and Mary Streitwieser for their help in acquiring and creating the
data.  The findings and opinions expressed do not reflect the position of the National Center for Postsecondary
Improvement, the Consortium for Policy Research in Education, the National School-to-Work Office, or the U.S.
Census Bureau.
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Introduction
If current proposals to boost the federal minimum wage to roughly $6.15 an hour are
passed by Congress and signed by the President, the minimum wage will have risen by almost
50% within the span of less than a decade.  Many policy makers appear to be at ease with the idea
of using minimum wages as a tool to address problems of the working poor because of recent
research suggesting that minimum wage increases have little if any impact on the employment of
low-skill workers (Card and Krueger 1995).  However, there are other areas of concern, in
addition to employment loss, that deserve careful research attention before concluding that
minimum wages are an effective policy tool to aid the working poor.  One of these is the impact
of minimum wages on job training, and thus on wage growth.
Human capital theory suggests that workers must contribute towards investments in job
training, and that one way in which they might do so is through reduced wages (Becker 1964).
However, to the extent workers contribute towards the cost of job training by accepting lower
wages, minimum wage laws may prevent this type of contribution and thereby reduce on-the-job
human capital formation (Rosen 1972).  Existing empirical studies of the relationship between
minimum wages and job training yield divergent results.  Most of these studies utilize worker
survey data and focus on the job training impact of minimum wages among a subset of workers.
Most of them also lack detailed measures of job training or establishment-level variables that are
important determinants of training.
In this paper, we overcome these various impediments by using an establishment data set
that possesses good measures of job training, good establishment-level control variables, and that
allows us to focus on the impact of minimum wages on the establishment work force as a whole.
The decision to offer training is ultimately made by the firm.  Even if workers pay for some or all2
of their training through lower wages, their decision to undertake training is largely made by the
choice of which firm to join.  Thus, the firm is the logical unit of analysis for exploring the issue of
job training and minimum wages.
In the first section of the paper, we briefly review the empirical literature on the impact of
minimum wages on job training.  The second and third sections discuss the empirical specification
and data to be used in the present analysis.  The fourth section discusses the empirical results.  We
find strong evidence that minimum wages reduce the percentage of the establishment workforce
receiving training, but only weak evidence that they reduce the hours of training received by a
typical worker.
Review of the Literature
The empirical literature on the impact of minimum wages on job training is not
voluminous.  The earliest efforts focussed primarily on wage growth as a proxy for training, and
the results were mixed.  In two studies, age-earnings profiles were significantly flatter among
workers whose wages were bound to the minimum (Leighton and Mincer 1981; Hashimoto
1982), while a third study (Lazear and Miller 1981) found no statistically significant relationship
between the bindingness of the minimum wage and the slope of age-earnings profiles.  Recent
evidence has cast serious doubt on the validity of this approach.
Grossberg and Sicilian (1999) find that while minimum wages are indeed associated with
reduced wage growth, they appear to have no significant impact on job training.  Acemoglu and
Pischke (1999) offer an insightful interpretation of these results.  They claim that minimum wages
eliminate part of the lower tail of the wage distribution, bunching workers around the wage
minimum and thereby lowering the age-earnings profile, and that this will be true independent of3
their impact on training.  Thus, it seems clear that future tests of the relationship between
minimum wages and job training must be conducted with information on worker training.
There are five studies that offer evidence on the impact of minimum wages directly on job
training.  The basic approach is to regress a measure of job training on the degree to which the
minimum wage is binding, the hypothesis being that the more binding the minimum wage the less
job training the worker and firm will undertake.  There exist two levels of analysis – one operating
at the state or region level and the other operating at the level of the individual worker.  Both
contain important drawbacks.
Leighton and Mincer (1981) and Neumark and Wascher (1998) exploit variation in state
minimums to explore the relationship between minimum wages and training.  Both use data on
individual workers, but their measures of the bindingness of wage minimums exist at the state
level.  For example, Neumark and Wascher measure the extent to which the state minimum wage
exceeded the federal minimum over the previous three years.  The results of both studies suggest
that the more binding the minimum wage, the less likely a worker will receive on-the-job training.
However, there is an econometric problem that plagues studies using more aggregate
measures of minimum wage bindingness with worker level data.  Because the right-hand-side
minimum wage variable is at a higher level of aggregation than the unit of observation, the
estimated standard errors may understate the inaccuracy of the estimators (Moulton 1986),
thereby leading the researcher to perhaps mistakenly conclude that minimum wages reduce
training when in fact they do not.  Acemoglu and Pischke (1999) conduct a similar type of
analysis, utilizing instead a regional measure of bindingness, in which they correct for this problem
in the standard errors of estimates.  They find little evidence for a minimum wage impact on
training in their results.4
A second level at which the analysis of this question has been conducted is at the
individual worker level.  Schiller (1994) and Grossberg and Sicilian (1999) adopt measures of
minimum wage bindingness that vary at the level of the individual worker.  Grossberg and Sicilian,
for example, compare the impact on training of workers who are paid the minimum wage with
those who earn both below the minimum and slightly more than the minimum.  Schiller finds
evidence that minimum wages reduce training, while Grossberg and Sicilian do not.
The problem with measures of minimum wage bindingness that vary at the level of the
individual worker is that omitted determinants of training are also in many cases likely to be
correlated with the wage, and therefore with the minimum wage bindingness measure.  The
estimated impact of minimum wages on training may well be biased as a result, the nature of the
bias depending on the exact specification employed.
Two of the most obvious examples of such bias in estimates of the minimum wage impact
on training result from the absence of controls for worker turnover and the endogeneity of the
wage component of the bindingness measure.  Efficiency wage theory suggests that high wages –
which implies less bindingness with wage minimums – may be paid by firms as a way of reducing
costly turnover (Akerlof and Yellen 1986).  Turnover reduction, on the other hand, may be a
prerequisite for on-the-job training (Prendergast 1993).  Indeed, there is empirical evidence to
suggest that the extent of training is both dependent upon and an important determinant of the
rate of labor turnover (Royalty 1996).  If turnover is related both to training and to the degree to
which the wage exceeds the mandated minimum in the way we have claimed, the failure to control
for turnover may bias upward the estimated impact of minimum wages on training.  None of the
studies of the impact of minimum wages on training have adequately controlled for labor
turnover.5
While it is possible that binding minimum wages reduce training, it is most probable that
training raises wages and thereby makes wages less bound to minimum wage standards.  The
wage component of the minimum wage bindingness measure is therefore likely to be correlated
with left-out determinants of training, biasing the estimated impact of minimum wages on training.
And, once again, the bias is likely to be upward.
1
Acemoglu and Pischke conduct a first-difference analysis of the individual worker training
equation using panel data.  Fixed components of the error term will be eliminated in this
approach, thereby reducing the possible bias found in cross-sectional levels regressions.
Acemoglu and Pischke find no evidence of a training effect of minimum wages in their results.
However, their measure of on-the-job training is a particularly blunt one – the change in whether
or not the worker received training.
Indeed, poor measures of training plague this literature more generally.  The more careful
studies in the literature employ as a measure of job training the dichotomous variable “whether or
not a worker received training on the job” (Neumark and Wascher 1998; Acemoglu and Pischke
1999).  An important exception is the Grossberg and Sicilian (1999) study, which utilizes data
from establishments.  The job training information they use refers to the amount of job training
given to the last-hired worker.  Specifically, their training measure is the number of hours devoted
to training over the first three months of tenure of the most recently hired worker.  Grossberg and
Sicilian do not, however, account for labor turnover or many other important establishment-level
variables.
In the present paper, we utilize a unique data set on establishments that offers a number of
improvements over the data used in the existing literature.  First, we have very good measures of
                                                       
1  The Grossberg and Sicilian results are not subject to this type of bias because they use the starting wage of the6
training – the percentage of the work force receiving training and the average hours of training.
Second, we possess good measures of a number of establishment-level control variables, such as
turnover and fringe benefits, that are absent from most existing studies.
We feel that using establishment data, and the establishment as the unit of analysis, has a
number of additional benefits besides perhaps providing us with better measures of training and
turnover.  Economies of scale in training and a host of other considerations suggest to us that job
training is likely to exist as a matter of policy at the establishment or firm level.  Workers receive
training by virtue of the firm to which they are attached.  Focussing on the determinants of
training from the worker’s point of view might make sense in a world of costless mobility, where
the public-good nature of training poses no real problem for individual choice (Tiebout 1956).
But, the very mention of job training typically suggests a context in which there is greater
attachment between worker and firm than ideal microeconomics models posit.
Moreover, focussing on the establishment draws our attention away from the impact of
minimum wages on individual groups of workers and towards their impact on the establishment
workforce as a whole.  This may be viewed by some as a criticism of our analysis, but we do not
view it that way.  Much of the existing literature identifies which group of workers is likely to be
affected by minimum wages, a priori, and then focuses on this group only, sometimes in relation
to other groups that are hypothesized, also in an a priori fashion, to be unaffected.  But, in fact,
designating groups of workers as “affected” and “unaffected” is often quite arbitrary.  An
establishment-level approach allows us to eschew this kind of a priori arbitrariness.
Finally, although we are unable to isolate which types of workers are affected by minimum
wages, we are able to shed light on the way in which minimum wages affect the workforce as a
                                                                                                                                                                                  
worker to construct their measure of minimum wage bindingness.7
whole.  In particular, we are able to say something about the form of the impact – whether
minimum wages reduce training completely for an unidentifiable segment of the workforce and
whether average hours decline.  Depending on the results, we also may be in a position to say
something about whether the reduction in training for one segment of the workforce is
compensated for by increased training of another segment.  These are largely unexplored issues in
the literature on minimum wage effects on job training.  Moreover, because existing studies
typically analyze different segments of the labor force, if there are both positive and negative
effects of minimum wages on training for different groups of workers, it is not surprising to find
divergent results.
Econometric Specification
The empirical approach we take resembles the analysis that exists in the recent literature,
but with establishment-level data that contain improved measures of job training.  In particular,
we regress the percent of workers trained and the average number of hours spent on training
activities on a set of establishment characteristics and a measure of the “bindingness” of the
minimum wage.  One specification of the training equation is thus
js s js j js M R X T e y d b a + + + + = ˆ (1)
js j s j js Z M X R n q h f g + + + + = (2)8
where the j and s subscripts denote establishment and state, respectively; T is the measure of
training; X is a set of establishment characteristics (e.g., industry, size, percent of female workers,
percent of workers with a high school diploma, etc.); M is the minimum wage bindingness
measure; R is the turnover rate; and Z is a vector of instruments (i.e., “percent of non-supervisors
unionized” and the “average number of weeks it takes to fill a position”) that are uncorrelated
with  js e .
The minimum wage measure introduced at this stage of the analysis is similar to that used
by Neumark and Wascher (1998).  It captures the “bindingness” of the minimum wage at the state
level by identifying states with minimum wages above the federal minimum and assigning each
establishment in those states the value of the difference in the minimums if the state minimum is
greater than the federal minimum, and zero otherwise.  There is, however, an econometric
problem with both this approach and those making use of regional or state-level minimum wage
measures.  Since the minimum wage variable in (1) is at a higher level of aggregation than the unit
of observation, the standard errors of the estimates may be biased downward, thereby allowing
one to mistakenly find in favor of statistical significance (Moulton 1986). The standard OLS
assumption of uncorrelated errors between the units of observation will be violated, and instead
the error structure will have the following form
js s js j l e + = (3)
where l  represents the component of the error that is common to all establishments in a given
state.9
To the extent that wages vary considerably within relatively small geographic boundaries,
state-level controls may not accurately reflect the “bindingness” of the minimum wage for those
workers (Acemoglu and Pischke 1999).  For example, in a given state where the minimum wage
exceeds the federal minimum, workers in high-wage areas will be less constrained than workers in
low-wage areas.  The same is true for workers in states where the minimum wage is set to the
federal standard.  The minimum wage variable in (1) is zero in all states where the minimum does
not exceed the federal minimum, so workers in establishments across numerous states, with
varying market wages are assumed to be equally bound by the minimum wage (in this case, not at
all).  Clearly, a better minimum wage measure is needed to determine the impact of minimum
wages on training.
To avoid these problems, we construct an establishment-level minimum wage measure that
captures the extent to which the average establishment wage exceeds the relevant minimum.
Acemoglu and Pischke (1999) construct a similar variable that measures the ratio of the minimum
wage to the average wage in the MSA (Metropolitan Statistical Area).  This is a better measure of
the bindingness of the minimum wage, but since wages vary considerably within MSAs, even less
aggregation may be more appropriate.  The ideal measure might capture the bindingness of the
minimum wage for a particular worker.  In our analysis, the unit of observation is an
establishment, so we construct a minimum wage measure that captures the average degree of
bindingness faced by workers at their place of employment.  Consequently, our minimum wage
variable is the ratio of the applicable minimum wage to the average wage in an establishment.
This approach mitigates the problem of the standard errors overstating the precision of the
estimated coefficients, but it also raises the possibility that estimated coefficients will suffer from
endogeneity bias.  While job training may be a function of the extent to which average wages10
exceed the stipulated minimum wage, it is also true that wages depend on training.  Thus, left out
determinants of training are likely to be correlated with the establishment average wage
component of the minimum wage bindingness measure.  We correct for this by instrumenting this
minimum wage variable with “percent of non-supervisors unionized” and the “natural log of total
sales” as identifying variables.  In this specification, turnover is also instrumented as in (1) and (2)
above.  This satisfies the over-identifying restrictions and allows us to perform generalized
method of moments (GMM) specification tests (Hausman 1978; Newey 1985).
Data
This study uses the 1997 National Employer Survey (NES), which is supplemented with
Standard Statistical Establishment List (SSEL) data.
2 This version of the NES contains
establishment location information that is used to examine covariation between minimum wages
and on-the-job training (Table 1 displays the minimum wage in cases where the state minimum
exceeded the federal minimum).  Geographical location information is obtained from the SSEL by
linking each establishment to their Census File Number (CFN).  The SSEL is the Census Bureau’s
master list of all establishments and enterprises in the United States.  It provides the sampling
frame for all of the Census Bureau’s economic censuses (conducted quinquenially in years ending
with 2 and 7) and surveys, including the NES.  The 1995 SSEL serves as the sampling frame for
the 1997 NES.
                                                       
2 This data is confidential under Title 13 and 26, United States Code.  Access was obtained through the Center for
Economic Studies (CES) while employed as a researcher for the Longitudinal Employer Household Dynamics
(LEHD) project at the U.S. Census Bureau.  Researchers can access this version of the NES only with a CES-
approved proposal (see http://www.ces.census.gov/ces.php/home).  A public-use version of the data is available at
http://www.irhe.upenn.edu/research/research-main.html11
Survey data was collected with a computer-assisted telephone interview (CATI).  The
sample was evenly divided between manufacturers and non-manufacturers, with explicit over-
sampling of establishments that have 100 or more employees and implicit over-sampling of
manufacturers because they are greatly outnumbered by non-manufacturers in the SSEL universe.
Establishments in California, Kentucky, Maryland, Michigan, and Pennsylvania were also over-
sampled in order to support in depth analysis of school reforms of interest to the survey sponsors
(the National Center for Postsecondary Improvement, the Consortium for Policy Research in
Education, and the National School-to-Work Office).
The survey was administered by the U.S. Census Bureau in the summer of 1997, and
asked establishments about conditions in 1996.
3 It represents the responses of approximately
5,400 establishments for a 78 percent overall response rate.  This is higher than the response rate
for other establishment surveys, but similar to those of the 1994 NES (Lynch and Black 1998).
The presence of over-sampled establishments requires the use of the provided weights in order to
produce representative statistics and parameter estimates.  In addition, 24 percent of
establishments that responded only partially completed the CATI questionnaire.  Therefore, the
results presented in the following sections refer to the set of establishments for which information
was available.  Table 2 provides descriptive statistics for these cases.
The availability of geographic information from the SSEL allows us to address our
research objectives and use the excellent measures of establishment-level training contained in the
NES.  While many previous studies have had to rely on dichotomous measures of training (i.e.,
the individual did or did not receive training), we are able to construct a variety of training
measures including the percent of workers trained and the average number of hours devoted to12
training in an establishment.  Furthermore, the data set contains measures of labor turnover and a
host of other variables that affect the firm’s decision to offer training.  Some, such as the gender
and racial composition and average level of schooling of the workforce, mirror the kinds of
variables one finds in estimated training regressions using individual-level survey data.  Others,
such as the quality of the local high school, are important worker-related determinants of job
training that are rarely captured in household survey data.  And still others, such as whether the
establishment has recently increased employment or is experimenting with new forms of
workplace organization (e.g., self-managed teams or job rotation), are establishment-level
variables that clearly impact training, but are virtually impossible to obtain from household survey
data.
Results
In Table 3, column 1 we present the results of the “percent trained” regression using state-
level variation in the minimum wage bindingness measure.  The results suggest that establishments
in states with minimum wages that exceed the federal minimum train a smaller percentage of their
workforce, and that the percentage trained falls as the difference between the state and federal
minimums rises.  For example, states with a minimum wage that is fifty cents above the federal
minimum possess establishments that train roughly half the percentage of the workforce that is
average for the entire regression sample.  Minimum wages have a sizeable effect on the
percentage of an establishment’s workforce that is trained.
Some of the other estimated coefficients from this regression are also interesting.  The
results suggest, for example, that medium size establishments, establishments with low turnover
                                                                                                                                                                                  
3 In October 1996 the federal minimum wage increased from $4.25 to $4.75, so we assign a weighted average to13
rates, and establishments with more educated workers train a larger percentage of their labor
force. The percentage of workers trained is also larger if the quality of high school graduates is
either unacceptable or outstanding rather than being merely acceptable.
The finding that high turnover is associated with less training is consistent with other
findings in the literature on training (e.g., Royalty).  The results on the quality of the local high
school suggest that firms may need to engage in blanket remedial training when the local high
school is unacceptable, but may take the opportunity to invest broadly in skills acquisition when
the local high school produces outstanding graduates.
Two of the results from the “percent trained” regression are particularly interesting, both
because they are surprising and because they shed light on the extent of job training in
establishments operating under the newest workplace arrangements.  The growth of both
temporary workers and work teams is well documented in the literature (e.g., Golden and
Appelbaum 1992; Osterman 1994a, 1994b).  Our results suggest that the greater use of temporary
workers and the pervasiveness of work teams increase the percentage of workers who receive
training.
The interpretation of these findings is not straightforward.  One plausible explanation of
the former result is the following. Suppose temporary workers are not considered part of an
establishment’s current workforce, and yet are essentially replacements for formerly in-house
workers who typically received no training in that capacity. In this case, the finding that a larger
percentage of the current workforce (which excludes the temporary workers) receives training in
establishments utilizing temporary workers may reflect no real change in the extent of training.
However, the training associated with high-performance workplaces, which utilize work teams
                                                                                                                                                                                  
represent the minimum wage for that year.14
and sophisticated systems of quality control and the newest technology, is probably truly reaching
a larger percentage of the plant’s workforce.
In column 2 of Table 3, we present the results for the “average hours of training”
regression.  The minimum wage difference variable is statistically significant and quantitatively
sizeable in this estimated equation as well.  Establishments in states with a state minimum that
exceeds the federal minimum by fifty cents possess ten fewer hours of training per worker, which
is roughly 80 percent of the mean of average hours for the regression sample.
A number of results are consistent across the “percent trained” and “average hours”
regressions.  For example, both the temporary workers and work teams variables affect the
percentage of the labor force that is trained as well as the average hours of training.  And medium
size firms devote, on average, a larger number of average hours to training a larger percentage of
their workforces.
Some variables become statistically significant in the “average hours” equation that were
not significant in the “percent trained” equation.  For example, those establishments witnessing
increased employment possess greater average hours of training – presumably reflecting the need
to devote greater training resources to newer workers – but the percentage of their labor forces
receiving training is no different from other firms, ceteris paribus.
The differences in results across the two equations are interesting because they shed light
on the joint impact of covariates on “percent trained” and “average hours.”  For example,
establishments with high labor turnover appear to train a smaller percentage of their labor forces,
but the hours they devote to training are apparently no different on average.  Thus, high turnover
firms devote the same hours to training as do low turnover firms, but they focus their training
resources on a smaller, presumably more stable percentage of the workforce.15
Establishments with a more highly educated labor force train a larger percentage of their
workers, but their hours of training are, on average, no different from establishments with less-
educated workers.  Establishments hiring high school graduates from either barely acceptable
quality high schools or truly superior quality high schools train a larger percentage of their
workers than do establishments in communities where the quality of training at the local high
school is totally unacceptable or only acceptable.  But the establishments with acceptable quality
high school graduates are the ones that devote the largest number of hours to training on average.
The results in Table 3 suggest that minimum wages lower both the percentage of an
establishment’s workforce receiving training as well as the average hours devoted to training
workers.  However, these results come from regressions in which the measure of minimum wage
bindingness varies at the state level only.  Under these circumstances, the standard errors of
estimates may understate the true error around the estimated coefficients, leading us to perhaps
erroneously conclude that minimum wages reduce training when in fact they do not.  We now
turn to an analysis of similar specifications of the training equations but with measures of
bindingness that vary at the establishment level, and which therefore do not possess this problem.
The results in column 1 of Table 4 are consistent with the earlier findings, which suggest
that minimum wages reduce the percentage of the establishment labor force receiving training.
The relative minimum wage variable is negative and statistically as well as quantitatively
significant.  A fifty cent increase in the mean minimum wage decreases the percentage of the labor
force receiving training by roughly 6.5 percentage points, or roughly 23 percent of the mean
percentage of workers trained.
With some important exceptions, the other findings are also basically similar to those
found in the previous analysis.  For example, the use of temporary workers and teams in16
production raises the percentage of the labor force receiving training.  Establishments with a more
educated labor force train a larger percentage of workers (although the result for the percentage
of college graduates is no longer statistically significant).
There are, however, a number of interesting differences between these and the previous
results.  Turnover is no longer negative and statistically significantly related to training.  The
percentage of female workers is positively and significantly associated with the percentage of
workers trained, whereas it was not statistically different from zero in the previous findings.  The
percentage of the labor force trained rises steadily with both the size of the establishment and the
quality of the local high school, whereas before it did not.  The percentage of part-time workers
among the work force is now negatively related to training, whereas before it was not statistically
significantly different from zero.
The difference in results across the two analyses is related to the fact that the average
establishment wage now appears on the right-hand-side of the training equation.  There are a
variety of reasons for including the wage in an estimated training equation.  For example, the
wage is an important indicator of the costs of training in that it captures the value of lost
production during periods when workers are learning but not producing.  Larger firms may train a
greater percentage of their workers, but they also typically have higher wages and therefore
higher costs of training.  Thus, the negative relationship between large firms and training found in
the previous analysis – which becomes positive and statistically significant in the current findings –
may be due to left-out variable bias.
However, not all of the differences in results can be interpreted by conceiving of the wage
as a left-out measure of training costs.  The relationship between training and turnover, for
example, goes from negative and statistically significant in the previous findings to positive and17
insignificant in the current results.  High turnover is typically thought to be associated with low
wages, and thus low costs of training.  Introducing the average establishment wage into the
estimated equation should therefore strengthen the negative relationship between turnover and
training, not make it weaker. Our interpretation of the differences in these results is as follows.
The negative effect of turnover on training comes entirely from wage effects: high wages reduce
turnover and therefore provide an environment in which training is profitable for workers and
firm.  Average wages held constant, however, the greater the turnover, the more training the firm
will be required to undertake among replacement workers.
In the last column of Table 4, we present the results for the “average hours of training”
regression.  The results suggest that the degree of bindingness of minimum wages has no
statistically significant effect on the average hours devoted to training.  This result contradicts our
findings from the previous analysis.  But, recall that the standard error of the estimate is likely to
be understated in the previous findings.  Moreover, the level of statistical significance on the
bindingness measure in those results was not extraordinarily high; a 35 percent increase in the
standard error, for example, would render the bindingness measure statistically insignificant at the
.01 level in this equation.
Comparing the results of the “average hours” equation with those of the “percent trained”
equation, we find that involvement in work teams is positively associated with both the intensity
and average pervasiveness of training among the work force.  While establishment size is
positively associated with “percent trained,” it is only medium size establishments that devote
more hours per worker to training.  Similarly, while the quality of the local high school is
positively associated with the pervasiveness of training among the work force, it is only when the
quality is just acceptable that more training per worker takes place.18
Perhaps the most interesting contrast between the first and second columns of results in
Table 4 regards the relative unimportance of part-time workers, temporary workers, and the
percentage of women in the work force in the estimated “average hours” equation.  These three
features of an establishment’s labor force are important determinants of the pervasiveness of
training, but do not appear to affect the intensity with which the average worker is trained.
Conclusions
This study utilizes establishment data to explore the impact of minimum wages on job
training.  There are several advantages to using establishment data, including better measures of
job training and good establishment-level control variables.  We find strong evidence to suggest
that minimum wages reduce the percentage of an establishment’s labor force that receives
training.  This is consistent with both theory and previous empirical findings suggesting that, by
restricting the ability of employees to contribute to training through foregone earnings, minimum
wages reduce the job training received by some workers.  Interestingly, however, we find much
weaker evidence to suggest that the average hours of training undertaken by the work force as a
whole is affected by minimum wages.
If, as recent evidence suggests (Card and Krueger 1995), there are virtually no negative
employment effects of minimum wages, these results indicate that some members of the work
force lose the opportunity to undertake training, but that others may be recipients of increased
hours of training as a result of minimum wages.  While a substitution effect on job training such as
this is not inconsistent with human capital theory, especially if minimum wages alter job
descriptions within the establishment, it has never been the topic of serious empirical
investigation.19
The possibility that minimum wages initiate a substitution in training among the work
force clearly warrants further investigation.  It suggests that minimum wages have a more
complicated impact on job training than previously thought, and offers a possible resolution to the
divergent results found heretofore in the empirical literature on minimum wages and training.  The
observed impact of minimum wages on training using worker survey data will depend crucially on
the sample of workers analyzed.  The impact can be negative, nonexistent, or even positive
depending on which segments of the workforce are chosen for analysis.20
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TABLE 1
States with Minimum Wages that Exceeded the Federal Minimum Wage





District of Columbia 5.25 0.875
Hawaii 5.25 0.875
Iowa 4.65 0.275
New Jersey 5.05 0.675
Oregon 4.75 0.375
Rhode Island 4.45 0.075
Vermont 4.75 0.375
Washington 4.90 0.525
Note – In 1996, the federal minimum wage was not implemented until October 1.  All other minimum wages were implemented at the beginning of the
calendar year.  The minimum wage gaps are calculated using a weighted average of the federal minimum wage (i.e., $4.375).24
TABLE 2
Variable Definitions and Descriptive Statistics
Variable                                                                                     Mean                                 Std. Dev.
Training:
percent of workers receiving training 45.1935 39.5869
average number of hours trained 22.2390 41.4760
Employment and Sales:
50-99 employees 0.1592 0.3659
100-249 employees 0.1973 0.3980
250-999 employees 0.3003 0.4584
1,000 or more employees 0.1416 0.3487
multiple establishment firm 0.6809 0.4662
employment increased in past 3 years 0.3364 0.4725
employment decreased in past 3 years 0.1721 0.3775
turnover rate 21.8764 27.6819
average number of weeks to fill a position 3.2165 3.1936
natural log of total sales 17.0026 1.9060
Region:
establishment located in west 0.1705 0.3761
establishment located in Midwest 0.2785 0.4483
establishment located in south 0.3682 0.4824
Workforce Characteristics:
percent 18+ with a high school diploma 30.6877 6.5910
percent 18+ with a bachelors degree 12.8352 5.0352
number of permanent part-time workers 27.2249 164.5741
number of temporary workers 17.2320 105.6286
percent of female workers 39.9133 26.4279
percent of minority workers 26.3487 25.7982
percent of front-line workers 57.9482 28.1885
percent of support staff workers 13.0862 14.5637
percent of technician workers 8.9134 14.9346
percent of supervisory workers 6.7866 6.2718
percent of non-supervisors unionized 20.6195 36.5418
quality of local high school unacceptable 0.0230 0.1500
quality of local high school barely acceptable 0.1131 0.3168
quality of local high school acceptable 0.4117 0.4922
quality of local high school more than adequate 0.1100 0.3129
quality of local high school outstanding 0.0106 0.1024
Workplace Organization:
percent of non-management in self-managed teams 16.1401 29.8220
percent of non-supervisors in job rotation 20.3863 31.3951
Compensation and Benefits:
average hourly wage 13.9887 4.5018
estab contributes to pension or severance 0.8123 0.3905
estab contributes to medical or dental 0.9759 0.1533
estab contributes to child care or family leave 0.7042 0.4565
estab contributes to life insurance 0.9105 0.2855
estab contributes to sick pay or vacation 0.9862 0.1167
Minimum Wage:
state min wage minus federal min wage 0.0323 0.1330
state min wage/average hourly wage 0.3447 0.103125
Note - These calculations are based on the sample of non-missing data for each respective variable and may not equal the regression means.26
TABLE 3
Estimated Effects of Minimum Wages on Training using the State-Level Binding Measure
(1) (2)
Explanatory Variable:                                                 Est                       Std Err                 Est                       Std Err
Employment:
50-99 employees 4.2813
** 1.7657 -0.0635 1.9251
100-249 employees 17.5320




1,000 or more employees -3.9268 5.9906 -7.2247 6.1419
multiple establishment firm 5.1546
*** 1.5521 -0.0566 1.7447
employment increased in past 3 years 1.0302 1.7415 4.6093
** 1.9158
employment decreased in past 3 years -2.4781 2.1952 -0.4409 2.4514
turnover rate (predicted) -0.3872
* 0.2052 -0.0880 0.2235
Region:
establishment located in west 19.5587
*** 2.7323 10.2974
*** 3.1021
establishment located in Midwest -2.2144 2.4544 -2.0502 2.8762
establishment located in south 0.2893 3.0796 -1.5105 3.4967
Workforce Characteristics:
percent 18+ with a high school diploma 0.9805
*** 0.2755 0.3687 0.3056
percent 18+ with a bachelors degree 1.0164
*** 0.3046 0.0498 0.3332
number of permanent part-time workers -0.0099 0.0062 0.0042 0.0062
number of temporary workers 0.0893
*** 0.0141 0.0572
** 0.0259
percent of female workers -0.0197 0.0386 0.0499 0.0419
percent of minority workers -0.0220 0.0431 -0.0225 0.0469
percent of front-line workers 0.1241
* 0.0641 0.1235
* 0.0695
percent of support staff workers 0.0237 0.0977 0.0440 0.1057
percent of technician workers 0.7361
*** 0.0840 0.5815
*** 0.0920
percent of supervisory workers 0.8308
*** 0.1567 0.9850
*** 0.1705
quality of local high school unacceptable 26.0814
*** 4.6796 7.5308 5.4073
quality of local high school barely acceptable 12.7987
*** 3.7032 7.7260
* 4.2964
quality of local high school acceptable 6.4091
** 2.3261 9.3639
*** 2.7314
quality of local high school more than adequate 14.7484
*** 3.2620 3.0999 3.7271
quality of local high school outstanding 22.3004
*** 7.3722 -0.2268 9.6633
Workplace Organization:
percent of non-management in self-managed teams 0.1618
*** 0.0232 0.1507
*** 0.0267
percent of non-supervisors in job rotation -0.0063 0.0273 -0.0438 0.0300
Benefits:
estab contributes to pension or severance 2.4007 2.1041 0.0480 2.2861
estab contributes to medical or dental -7.5311
** 3.4768 -5.3453 3.8788
estab contributes to child care or family leave 5.9884
*** 1.5652 2.8097 1.7907
estab contributes to life insurance 14.3245
*** 2.3238 10.2742
*** 2.5714










* p<.10; ** p<.05; *** p<.01
Note – The dependent variable in (1) is the percent of workers trained and the dependent variable in (2) is the average number of hours spent on
training activities.  All equations include 20 industry dummies and are estimated with the percent of workers receiving training as the dependent
variable.  Samples are restricted to establishments reporting all of the necessary information.  The average number of weeks to fill a position and the
percent of non-supervisors unionized are instruments used to predict turnover.  A GMM specification test validated the choice of instruments.27
TABLE 4
Estimated Effects of Minimum Wages on Training using the Establishment-Level Binding Measure
(1) (2)
Explanatory Variable:                                                 Est                       Std Err                 Est                       Std Err
Employment:
50-99 employees 9.5452
*** 1.8976 0.9272 2.2272
100-249 employees 13.1367




1,000 or more employees 29.6375
*** 8.1260 15.2605
* 8.8947
multiple establishment firm -3.2691
* 1.9152 -3.3351 2.2771
employment increased in past 3 years 3.3199
* 1.8328 6.6155
*** 2.1513
employment decreased in past 3 years -1.1316 2.3228 -1.1075 2.7802
turnover rate (predicted) 0.3719 0.2587 0.1777 0.2954
Region:
establishment located in west 30.4560
*** 2.9925 15.3037
*** 3.6906
establishment located in Midwest 2.4770 2.5556 0.6877 3.2156
establishment located in south 9.3449
** 3.3583 0.9204 4.1060
Workforce Characteristics:
percent 18+ with a high school diploma 1.2190
*** 0.2840 0.4048 0.3383
percent 18+ with a bachelors degree 0.4031 0.3521 -0.3478 0.4064
number of permanent part-time workers -0.0190
** 0.0068 -0.0047 0.0073
number of temporary workers 0.0920
*** 0.0144 0.0073 0.0288
percent of female workers 0.1677
*** 0.0507 0.0596 0.0586
percent of minority workers -0.0372 0.0449 -0.0152 0.0520
percent of front-line workers 0.3247
*** 0.0785 0.2160
** 0.0913
percent of support staff workers 0.3603
*** 0.1154 0.2046 0.1347
percent of technician workers 0.6568
*** 0.0912 0.5762
*** 0.1057
percent of supervisory workers 0.6009
*** 0.1791 1.1322
*** 0.2033
quality of local high school unacceptable 15.3576
*** 5.2213 9.9543 6.6081
quality of local high school barely acceptable 13.9492
*** 3.8989 5.7150 4.7461
quality of local high school acceptable 16.8657
*** 2.7422 11.5186
*** 3.2848
quality of local high school more than adequate 20.6616
*** 3.4248 3.0780 4.1150
quality of local high school outstanding 47.1828
*** 8.5608 0.0792 11.7865
Workplace Organization:
percent of non-management in self-managed teams 0.1520
*** 0.0244 0.1558
*** 0.0299
percent of non-supervisors in job rotation 0.0018 0.0290 -0.0561 0.0343
Benefits:
estab contributes to pension or severance -8.1748
** 2.8845 -0.8986 3.2853
estab contributes to medical or dental -39.2167
*** 6.3809 -15.3130
** 7.5315
estab contributes to child care or family leave 0.2072 1.8217 1.1626 2.2138
estab contributes to life insurance 20.0572
*** 2.4284 14.9651
*** 2.9106




state min wage/average hourly wage (predicted) -186.0728




* p<.10; ** p<.05; *** p<.01
Note - The dependent variable in (1) is the percent of workers trained and the dependent variable in (2) is the average number of hours spent on
training activities.  All equations include 20 industry dummies and are estimated with the average number of hours trained as the dependent variable.
Samples are restricted to establishments reporting all of the necessary information.  The average number of weeks to fill a position and the percent of
non-supervisors unionized are instruments used to predict turnover.  The natural log of total sales and the percent of non-supervisors unionized are
instruments used to predict state min wage/average hourly wage.  A GMM specification test validated the choice of instruments.